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irst, a declaration of interest, as an ordinary citizen of the United Kingdom, who 
has English, Irish, Scottish and mongrel British DNA in his veins, and was 
brought up at university on some of the great Scots like David Hume and Adam 
Smith, while enjoying Sean Connery as James Bond; for the likes of me, the idea of 
Scottish secession was something plain alien to mind and soul. 
To the European Union, the prospect of Scottish secession from the UK loomed up as 
a key component of the nightmare scenario of everything falling apart, inside and 
outside. The nightmares are already firmly in place outside, from Putin’s war to destroy 
Ukraine to ISIS beheading hostages in the Levant. And now the Scottish secession 
could lead on to UK secession from the EU and to grave escalation of political conflict 
in Spain over Catalonia, and so on to a Europe of Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and a 
broad spread of extreme-right populists. The propagandists of the Kremlin would have 
greatly enjoyed the Schadenfreude of this final crumbling of the British empire, 
alongside the renaissance of Putin’s Russian empire, completing the revenge for the 
Crimean war. In brief, the end of civilised Europe.  
But this morning we learn that the majority stuck to the UK with a bigger margin than 
anyone had dared expect – 55.4 to 44.6.  
Brussels’ next thoughts are about what this does to the UK in the EU. The key 
comparison is about the contest between emotions and calculations. For the Scottish 
bagpipes, read the British bulldog spirit. For the future of the Scottish pound and its 
budget calculations, read the costs and benefits of multiple EU policies. The prevailing 
view is that populist emotions will outvote objective calculations of the accountant and 
economist. The Scottish vote gives heart to those in the EU who will want to plod on 
with getting EU policies right, or at least their major problems sorted out. More 
precisely for Britain in the EU, the ongoing balance of competences review is showing, 
volume by volume, that most EU policies are doing what they should do, and the case 
for repatriation or secession does not hold water. Will the messages from this material 
enter into the common sense of the British people by referendum time in 2017? Maybe. 
Hope springs eternal, and hope was given a fillip today. 
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But even at the level of emotions, the Scottish experience should help. The English got 
the shock of their lives just a few days ago when a poll suggested a Yes majority. Maybe 
the English public will conclude that they don’t want to peer into the unknown again. 
There is also some puzzlement at the simplistic and inept management of the 
referendum, so surprising coming from the mother of democracies. By comparison, 
Belgium’s handling of its own separatist tendencies in Flanders is much sounder. Let 
there be a continuing process of constitutional adjustment to the powers of the centre 
versus the regions. Refine the system in a spirit of compromise, rather than force it into 
a binary choice of yes or no, in or out. Or if you have to have a referendum, avoid bias 
in the question, offering alternative 1 versus alternative 2, rather than risking that the 
Yes will sound so positive versus the very negative No. Or have triple options – 
independence versus enhanced autonomy versus status quo – and then two rounds if 
necessary to find the majority. Or follow the practice of many democracies that require 
a ‘constitutional majority’ of around two-thirds for major constitutional changes. There 
was also the problem of the 700,000 Scots in England not able to vote, whereas all the 
Polish plumbers in Glasgow could do so. Rather than preparing for a careful 
mechanism of popular choice, Prime Minister Cameron threw caution to the wind, 
deciding on the most simplistic and hazardous method.  
At the most practical level of politics, if Cameron has lost Scotland, this would have 
finished off his premiership. A coup to replace him would be organised in the 
Conservative party, whose overwhelming Eurosceptic or Europhobe majority would 
then elect a successor who would demand drastic repatriation of powers from Brussels, 
or further opt-outs on a grand scale. The process of renegotiating terms with the EU 
would be impossible, and the referendum would produce a big majority for secession. 
By comparison, Cameron has become very reasonable, since his apparent agenda for 
reform of the EU and the UK’s place in it seems quite negotiable.  
And so, the nightmare scenario did not unfold and Brussels can return to its business, 
with its own renewed leadership even feeling perhaps now a bit encouraged to go about 
their burdensome agenda with more confidence. 
 
